Salesforce CRT-450 - Salesforce Certified Platform Developer 1 (SP25)

B: Salesforce requires that all Apex code have at least 75% test coverage in production before deployment. This ensures that the system remains reliable.

C: All triggers must have some test coverage as part of the overall 75% requirement for Apex code.

Why not other options?

A: Object visibility settings are not a deployment requirement.

D: Visual Flows do not require test coverage for deployment to production.

Apex Test Coverage Requirements

Abefore triggerfires when records are inserted, updated, or deleted. Using the Data Loader or Bulk API to import data updates records, which triggers thebefore insertorbefore updateevents.

Not Suitable:

Option A: Renaming or replacing picklists does not trigger a record-level operation.

Option B: The Mass Address Update tool is not a record operation that triggersbeforetriggers.

Option D: Converting leads to contacts triggers lead conversion events, not directly related to Account triggers.

Apex Triggers

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract:

To determine which Visualforce code snippet presents a security vulnerability, we need to evaluate each option for potential risks, such as cross-site scripting (XSS), based on Salesforce’s Visualforce security best practices. XSS vulnerabilities occur when user input is rendered on a page without proper sanitization, allowing malicious scripts to execute. Let’s analyze each option systematically, referencing Salesforce’s official documentation, particularly the Visualforce Developer Guide and Secure Coding Guidelines.

Understanding Visualforce Security:

Visualforce Components: Components like and are used to display data on a Visualforce page. Their behavior regarding HTML escaping (sanitizing output to prevent script injection) is critical to security.

XSS Vulnerability: XSS occurs when untrusted user input (e.g., from URL parameters or controller variables) is rendered as HTML without escaping special characters (e.g., <, >, &). The Visualforce Developer Guide states: “To prevent XSS, Visualforce automatically escapes output unless explicitly disabled, but developers must be cautious with user input” (Salesforce Visualforce Developer Guide, Secure Coding for Visualforce).

Key Security Features:

: By default, escapes HTML characters unless escape="false" is set.

: Automatically escapes output and is designed for bound fields, reducing XSS risk.

User input (e.g., ApexPages.currentPage().getParameters()) must be sanitized to prevent injection of scripts like .

Evaluating the Options:

A. <apex:outputText value="{!ApexPages.currentPage().getParameters().get('userInput')}" />

Component: Uses to display a URL parameter (userInput) accessed via ApexPages.currentPage().getParameters().get('userInput').

Escaping: The escape attribute is not specified, so defaults to escape="true". The Visualforce Developer Guide confirms: “The apex:outputText component escapes HTML characters by default, converting characters like < to < to prevent script execution” (Salesforce Visualforce Developer Guide, apex:outputText).

Security: Even though userInput is untrusted (coming from a URL parameter), the default escaping ensures that any malicious content (e.g., ) is rendered as plain text (e.g., <script>alert('hack');</script>), preventing XSS.

Conclusion: Safe, as default escaping mitigates XSS risks.

Note on Typo: The question likely contains a typo in “SCurrentPage” (should be ApexPages.currentPage()). For analysis, we assume the correct syntax, as the intent is clear.

B. <apex:outputText escape="false" value="{!ApexPages.currentPage().getParameters().get('userInput')}" />

Component: Uses to display the userInput URL parameter.

Escaping: Explicitly sets escape="false", disabling HTML escaping. The Visualforce Developer Guide warns: “Setting escape=’false’ on apex:outputText allows unescaped output, which can lead to XSS vulnerabilities if the data is not sanitized” (Salesforce Visualforce Developer Guide, Secure Coding for Visualforce).

Security: With escape="false", any malicious input in userInput (e.g., ) is rendered as executable HTML, enabling XSS. For example, a URL like ?userInput= would execute the script in the user’s browser. The Salesforce Secure Coding Guidelines explicitly state: “Avoid setting escape=’false’ on apex:outputText when rendering untrusted input, such as URL parameters” (Salesforce Secure Coding Guidelines, Cross-Site Scripting).

Conclusion: Presents a security vulnerability (XSS) due to disabled escaping with untrusted input.

Note on Typo: The question has a typo in “sCurrentPage” (should be ApexPages.currentPage()). We assume the correct syntax for analysis.

C. <apex:outputField value="{!ctrl.userInput}" rendered="{!isEditable}" />

Component: Uses to display a controller variable (ctrl.userInput), with a rendered attribute based on isEditable.

Escaping: is designed to display field values from sObjects and automatically escapes output to prevent XSS. The Visualforce Developer Guide states: “The apex:outputField component renders field data with automatic HTML escaping, ensuring safe output” (Salesforce Visualforce Developer Guide, apex:outputField). Even if ctrl.userInput contains malicious content, it’s rendered as plain text.

Security: The value attribute expects a field reference (e.g., {!object.FieldName}), but here it’s bound to a controller variable (ctrl.userInput). This is unconventional, as is typically used for sObject fields. However, even if ctrl.userInput is untrusted, the automatic escaping prevents XSS. The rendered attribute (isEditable) controls visibility and does not affect escaping.

Conclusion: Safe, as escapes output, though the usage is atypical.

Note on Typo: The question has a typo in the value attribute: “(!ctrl.userinput)” should be {!ctrl.userInput} (curly braces instead of parentheses), and “isfditable” should be isEditable. We assume the corrected syntax: .

D. <apex:outputField value="{!ctrl.userInput}" />

Component: Uses to display a controller variable (ctrl.userInput).

Escaping: As with option C, automatically escapes output, preventing XSS. The Visualforce Developer Guide confirms: “apex:outputField ensures safe rendering by escaping special characters” (Salesforce Visualforce Developer Guide, apex:outputField).

Security: Even if ctrl.userInput contains malicious content, it’s rendered as plain text, mitigating XSS risks. Like option C, using for a controller variable is unusual, but it does not introduce a vulnerability.

Conclusion: Safe, as escapes output.

Note on Typo: The question has a typo in the value attribute: “{'ctrl.userInput}” should be {!ctrl.userInput} (correct merge field syntax). We assume the corrected syntax: .

Why Option B is Correct:

Option B presents a security vulnerability because:

It uses with escape="false", disabling HTML escaping.

It renders untrusted user input (ApexPages.currentPage().getParameters().get('userInput')) directly, allowing malicious scripts to execute, which is a classic XSS vulnerability.

The Salesforce Secure Coding Guidelines explicitly warn against this practice: “Rendering unescaped user input, such as URL parameters, can allow attackers to inject scripts” (Salesforce Secure Coding Guidelines, Cross-Site Scripting).

The other options (A, C, D) either use default escaping ( in A) or inherently safe components ( in C and D), preventing XSS.

Handling Typos:

The question contains several typos, which were corrected for analysis:

Option A: “SCurrentPage” → ApexPages.currentPage().

Option B: “sCurrentPage” → ApexPages.currentPage().

Option C: “(!ctrl.userinput)” → {!ctrl.userInput}, “isfditable” → isEditable.

Option D: “{'ctrl.userInput}” → {!ctrl.userInput}.These corrections align with standard Visualforce and Apex syntax, ensuring the analysis reflects the intended functionality.

Example of the Vulnerability (Option B):

Consider a Visualforce page with option B’s code:

If a user accesses the page with a URL like:

https://example.salesforce.com/apex/MyPage?userInput=

The script is rendered as executable HTML, displaying an alert in the user’s browser, demonstrating an XSS attack. In contrast, option A (with default escaping) would render the script as plain text, preventing execution.

Mitigating the Vulnerability:

To fix option B, either:

Remove escape="false" to enable default escaping:

Sanitize the input in the controller using methods like String.escapeHtml4():

public String getUserInput() {

String input = ApexPages.currentPage().getParameters().get('userInput');

return input != null ? String.escapeHtml4(input) : '';

}

The Visualforce Developer Guide recommends: “Sanitize untrusted input or rely on Visualforce’s built-in escaping to prevent XSS” (Salesforce Visualforce Developer Guide, Secure Coding for Visualforce).

Anonymous Apex allows developers to execute ad hoc code snippets without creating a permanent class or trigger. It is useful for tasks like bulk data manipulation or testing.

B. Deleting 15,000 inactive Accounts:

Anonymous Apex can perform ad hoc bulk operations to clean up data after a deployment.

Example:

Use Cases:List inactiveAccounts = [SELECT Id FROM Account WHERE IsActive__c = false LIMIT 15000];

delete inactiveAccounts;

C. Running a batch Apex class:

Anonymous Apex can execute batch jobs for data processing.

Example:

apex

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Database.executeBatch(new UpdateContactBatch());

A. Schedule an Apex class to run periodically: This requires a scheduled job, not Anonymous Apex.

D. Add unit test code coverage: Unit tests must be written in test classes and cannot be added using Anonymous Apex.

A: Formula fields are calculated at runtime based on the formula definition and are not stored in the database.

C: Formula fields can reference fields from related objects, allowing cross-object calculations.

Why not other options?

B: Formulas cannot reference themselves; doing so would result in a circular reference error.

D: If a field used in a formula field is deleted, the formula field will break, and Salesforce will prevent deletion until the formula field is updated.

Formula Fields Documentation

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract:

The provided code runs a SOQL query inside a for loop, which violates Salesforce’s governor limit of 100 SOQL queries per transaction. To avoid hitting these limits, the best practice is to perform queries outside of loops by using a single query that retrieves all required records at once.

Why a try/catch block is required:

In Salesforce, DML operations such as insert, update, delete, and upsert can throw exceptions due to issues like validation rule violations, field constraints, or sharing rule restrictions.

Using a try/catch block ensures that these exceptions are caught and handled gracefully, preventing the entire transaction from failing.

How to modify the code:

The update statement in the code can be wrapped in a try/catch block to catch and handle any exceptions that occur. For example:

apex

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public static void insertAccounts(List theseAccounts) {

try {

for (Account thisAccount : theseAccounts) {

if (thisAccount.website == null) {

thisAccount.website = 'https://www.demo.com ';

}

}

update theseAccounts;

} catch (DmlException e) {

System.debug('DML Exception: ' + e.getMessage());

}

}

Why not the other options?

A. Implement the upsert DML statement:

upsert is used to either insert or update records based on an external ID or primary key. It does not inherently handle exceptions.

B. Implement Change Data Capture:

Change Data Capture (CDC) is used for tracking changes to data in real time and is unrelated to handling DML exceptions.

D. Remove null items from the list of Accounts:

While cleaning the input data is a good practice, it does not address the need for exception handling during DML operations.

Declarative customizations, such as workflows, process builder, validation rules, and flows, offer a no-code approach to customizing Salesforce. Below are the key benefits:

Declarative customizations automatically update with each Salesforce release (A):Salesforce ensures that declarative tools are automatically updated during new releases, eliminating the need for manual intervention or code refactoring.

The Data Import Wizard allows importing data while adhering to Salesforce's sharing and security model. By setting field-level security, sensitive fields can be hidden from unauthorized users.

Other Options:

Option A: Encrypting data externally is unnecessary since Salesforce has built-in security features.

Option B: Using the Data Loader with Apex adds unnecessary complexity.

Option D: The Salesforce CLI does not provide direct data import capabilities with security settings.

Data Import Wizard Documentation

A: An External ID field is designed to store an ID from another external system, which can be used to match Salesforce records with data from an external source during data imports or integrations.

D: External ID fields are automatically indexed, which can significantly improve the performance of SOQL queries when filtering based on the External ID.

Why not other options?

B: External IDs cannot be formula fields. Only text, number, email, and auto-number fields can be set as External IDs.

C: While External IDs are useful for integrations, they do not make external data visible within Salesforce Mobile.

External IDs Overview