ECCouncil 212-89 - EC Council Certified Incident Handler (ECIH v3)

The Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) is a tool designed to assess a computer or network's security state by checking for missing security updates and common security misconfigurations. In the scenario with Finn, who is working in the eradication phase of an incident response process, the use of MBSA makes sense. The tool's ability to detect missing security patches and recommend the installation of the latest patches is crucial for eliminating vulnerabilities in the Windows operating system that could be the root cause of the incident.

MBSA scans the system for missing security updates, misconfigurations, and other vulnerabilities and provides detailed reports and recommendations for remediation. This step is vital in the eradication phase, where the goal is to remove the root causes of the incident and secure the system against future attacks. By ensuring that all necessary patches are applied, Finn is addressing any security gaps that could be exploited by attackers.

A Trojan, or Trojan horse, is a type of malware that disguises itself as a legitimate, harmless program or file to trick users into downloading and installing it. Once activated, a Trojan can perform a range of malicious activities, including giving attackers unauthorized access to the infected system. This can lead to the theft of sensitive information, such as credit card numbers and passwords, and can also allow the attacker to install additional malware, potentially leading to further damage, such as the erasure of data. Unlike viruses and worms, Trojans do not replicate themselves but rely on the deception of users to spread.

System characterization is the process of defining the boundaries of an IT system, which includes identifying the resources, information, and functionality that constitute the system. This process is crucial for understanding the scope of the system, the data it processes, and the technology it employs. By characterizing a system, incident handlers can better understand the system's normal operations and behaviors, which is essential for identifying anomalies that may indicate a security incident. System characterization involves documenting the hardware, software, network configuration, data flows, and other critical elements of the IT environment. This foundational knowledge supports effective incident handling by providing a baseline against which suspicious activities can be compared.

In the ECIH Incident Handling lifecycle, once a breach is detected, the IH&R team must focus on analysis and scoping to understand how the attack occurred, what systems were affected, and whether the attacker still has access.

Option D is correct because analyzing logs with Incident Response Automation and Orchestration (IRAO) tools allows rapid correlation of events, identification of attacker entry points, and determination of breach scope. ECIH stresses that zero-day incidents require deep forensic and timeline analysis to ensure complete containment and prevent recurrence.

Options A and C are important but depend on accurate breach understanding. Option B is premature without full incident context.

Therefore, log analysis and origin tracing is the correct primary focus.

This scenario represents a failure in the Preparation phase of the Incident Handling and Response (IH&R) lifecycle as defined by the EC-Council ECIH curriculum. Preparation focuses on establishing policies, procedures, standards, and awareness programs that define how systems and data must be used and protected. In this case, employees were sharing credentials via unauthorized channels because the organization failed to provide explicit rules governing acceptable communication practices.

Option C is correct because establishing defined protocols for approved digital channels directly addresses the root cause. ECIH emphasizes that organizations must define acceptable use policies, secure communication standards, and data handling procedures before incidents occur. These controls reduce the likelihood of human error and insider misuse by setting clear expectations and enforceable boundaries.

Option A relates to physical surveillance risks, which are unrelated to credential sharing. Option B is a recovery-focused control and does not prevent misuse. Option D is a detection mechanism that cannot compensate for missing governance controls.

By defining approved channels and educating users on their proper use, organizations significantly reduce the probability of credential leakage and insider-driven incidents, fulfilling a core ECIH preparation requirement.

The EC-Council Incident Handler (ECIH) curriculum stresses the importance of maintaining evidence integrity during recovery operations. Documenting the chain of custody ensures that evidence remains admissible in legal proceedings and maintains forensic validity.

Chain of custody documentation tracks who handled the evidence, when it was accessed, how it was stored, and what actions were performed. This aligns directly with forensic compliance principles, which require proper evidence preservation, documentation, and controlled handling procedures.

While restoring systems, responders must ensure that backup media and affected systems are handled in a way that does not compromise evidence. ECIH emphasizes that recovery should not destroy or contaminate forensic artifacts that may be required for legal, regulatory, or disciplinary action.

Option B (Network segmentation) relates to containment strategies. Option C (Immutable infrastructure) refers to architectural resilience models. Option D (Enhanced authentication) concerns access control, not evidence handling.

Therefore, Logan is adhering to forensic compliance principles during recovery.

Explanation (cloud IR reality):

In multi-vector cloud incidents, the defining challenge is coordination across layered services—identity (IAM), networking (WAF/CDN/LB), compute (VMs/containers/functions), email/collaboration, endpoints, and third-party SaaS integrations. Each vector often lands in a different plane: phishing compromises identities; malware persists on endpoints or workloads; DDoS stresses edge/network layers. Responding effectively requires aligning containment actions across these domains so one mitigation doesn’t leave another door open (e.g., stopping DDoS but leaving compromised identities active, or cleaning a workload while malicious OAuth tokens remain valid).

(B) is important but is a subset of coordination—CSP communication is one dependency in the broader multi-service response. (C) is a tactical DDoS problem and matters, but the incident includes phishing + malware, so focusing only on traffic classification is insufficient. (A) matters for regulated firms, but during active response, compliance is usually addressed through predefined procedures; it’s not the main operational obstacle in stopping a multi-vector campaign.

So (D) best captures the cloud-specific complexity: distributed ownership, shared responsibility boundaries, and the need for synchronized actions (revoking tokens, isolating workloads, adjusting security groups, WAF rules, email protections, and endpoint containment) to truly break the kill chain.

In a disassociation attack, the attacker sends disassociation frames to a wireless access point (AP) using a spoofed MAC address of a client or to the client pretending to be the AP. This forces the target to disconnect and often reconnect, causing a disruption in the wireless connectivity. Such attacks can be used to create a denial-of-service condition for the client, making the network resource unavailable. The primary objective of this attack is not to eavesdrop but to disrupt the normal operation of the wireless connection between the client and the AP.

The EC-Council Incident Handler (ECIH) curriculum explains that insider data exfiltration frequently occurs through legitimate channels such as HTTPS to bypass traditional firewall rules. When encrypted traffic is not inspected, sensitive data can be transmitted without detection.

Data Loss Prevention (DLP) tools monitor, detect, and block unauthorized transmission of sensitive information across endpoints, networks, and cloud services. DLP solutions can inspect encrypted traffic (when integrated with SSL/TLS inspection mechanisms) and enforce policies that prevent confidential data from leaving the organization.

The absence of deep packet inspection allowed encrypted HTTPS traffic to evade detection. Implementing DLP would provide content-aware monitoring and policy-based enforcement, reducing insider exfiltration risk.

Option A (biometric authentication) controls access, not outbound data flows. Option C (secure coding) relates to software development security. Option D (USB blocking) addresses removable media exfiltration, not encrypted network traffic.

Therefore, implementing Data Loss Prevention (DLP) tools is the appropriate eradication control.