ECCouncil 212-89 - EC Council Certified Incident Handler (ECIH v3)

When an attacker installs a fake AP (Access Point) within a company's network, especially behind a firewall, this constitutes the deployment of a Rogue Access Point. Rogue APs are unauthorized wireless access points installed within a network without the network administrator's knowledge or consent. They pose a significant security risk because they can be used to intercept sensitive information, bypass network security configurations, and provide a gateway for attackers to enter the network undetected. This type of attack circumvents the security measures put in place by a company, including firewalls, by creating an illicit entry point into the network that is under the control of the attacker.

This scenario exemplifies a classic malicious insider threat, where a trusted employee with legitimate access abuses their privileges. According to the EC-Council ECIH curriculum, traditional perimeter controls and static access restrictions are often ineffective against insiders because the actions appear legitimate at a surface level. Therefore, the primary emphasis must be on behavior-based detection.

Option D is correct because behavioral analytics enables organizations to establish baselines of normal employee behavior and identify deviations such as unusual access times, excessive data downloads, atypical system usage, or abnormal data transfer patterns. ECIH highlights behavioral monitoring as a critical control for detecting insider threats early, especially when access credentials are valid and authorized.

Option A may limit productivity and does not detect malicious intent. Option B is an administrative practice with limited security value. Option C improves awareness but does not detect deliberate malicious behavior.

By implementing behavioral analytics, ClobalTech can identify subtle indicators of insider misuse, respond earlier, and reduce the impact of long-term data exfiltration, aligning with ECIH best practices for insider threat mitigation.

The data preprocessing step performed by Johnson, where he analyzes user activities within a certain time period to create time-ordered domain sequences for further analysis on sequential patterns, is known as user-specific sessionization. This process involves aggregating all user activities and requests into discrete sessions based on the individual user, allowing for a coherent analysis of user behavior over time. This is critical for identifying patterns that may indicate a watering hole attack, where attackers compromise a site frequently visited by the target group to distribute malware. User-specific sessionization helps in isolating and examining sequences of actions taken by users, making it easier to detect anomalies or patterns indicative of such an attack.

In the scenario described, Stanley aims to ensure that the digital evidence he collected is admissible in court. This means the evidence must be gathered, handled, and presented in a manner that complies with legal standards, ensuring it can be legally used in a trial. Admissibility is a crucial characteristic of digital evidence, as it must be relevant, authentic, and obtained without violating any laws or rights to privacy. The evidence must also be presented in a clear and comprehensible manner to be understood by the members of the jury, which further supports its admissibility in court.

This scenario involves active mobile spyware infections, representing an immediate confidentiality risk. The ECIH Endpoint and Mobile Incident Handling guidance prioritizes containment when active compromise is detected.

Option C is correct because disconnecting infected devices immediately prevents further data leakage and lateral movement. Initiating forensic analysis allows responders to determine scope, data accessed, and persistence mechanisms. ECIH emphasizes that containment must precede long-term control improvements.

Option A is preventive and strategic but not immediate. Option B addresses future behavior. Option D mitigates credential risk but does not stop spyware activity.

Thus, immediate isolation and forensic analysis is the correct first response.

In the practice of digital forensics and incident handling, evidence bags play a crucial role in preserving the integrity and chain of custody of physical and digital evidence. The information typically included in the documentation on evidence bags encompasses the date and time of seizure, which provides a timestamp for when the evidence was collected; the exhibit number, which is a unique identifier assigned to each piece of evidence for tracking and reference purposes; and the name of the incident responder or individual who collected the evidence, ensuring accountability and traceability. This documentation is essential for maintaining the chain of custody, a critical element in legal proceedings, as it helps establish the evidence's authenticity and integrity by detailing its handling from collection to presentation in court. Options A, B, and C describe types of digital evidence but are not directly related to the content typically documented on evidence bags.

ECIH insider threat guidance highlights Data Loss Prevention (DLP) as a core technical control for preventing unauthorized data exfiltration, regardless of motive.

Option C is correct because DLP systems monitor, detect, and block sensitive data transfers across endpoints, networks, and cloud services. Even trusted insiders with legitimate access can be prevented from exfiltrating data without authorization.

Options A and B are administrative controls that do not scale well. Option D addresses morale but not security enforcement.

By implementing DLP, NeuroNet can enforce data protection policies while maintaining productivity, aligning directly with ECIH best practices.

The ECIH Insider Threat module stresses that insider monitoring must be lawful, proportional, and privacy-aware. Organizations must balance security with legal and ethical constraints.

Option A is correct because advanced employee monitoring tools can analyze behavior patterns, access anomalies, and data movement while respecting privacy regulations. These tools typically focus on metadata and risk indicators rather than invasive surveillance.

Options B, C, and D are intrusive, legally risky, and inconsistent with ECIH guidance. Keystroke logging and physical surveillance can violate privacy laws, while inspecting personal devices without consent is often unlawful.

ECIH recommends behavioral analytics and privacy-conscious monitoring as the most effective and defensible approach to detecting insider threats.

When Joseph, the IH&R team lead, alerted service providers, developers, and manufacturers about the affected resources, he was engaged in the Containment stage of the Incident Handling and Response (IH&R) process. Containment involves taking steps to limit the spread or impact of an incident and to isolate affected systems to prevent further damage. Alerting relevant stakeholders, including service providers and developers, is part of containment efforts to ensure that the threat does not escalate and that measures are taken to protect unaffected resources. This stage precedes eradication and recovery, focusing on immediate response actions to secure the environment.

Bob is in the Investigation phase of the forensic investigation process. This phase involves the detailed examination and analysis of the collected evidence to identify the source of the crime and the perpetrator behind the incident. It is a crucial step that follows the acquisition and preservation of evidence, where the incident responder applies various techniques and methodologies to analyze the evidentiary data. This analysis aims to uncover how the cybercrime was committed, trace the activities of the culprit, and gather actionable intelligence to support legal actions and prevent future incidents.