PRMIA 8010 - Operational Risk Manager (ORM) Exam

Explanation

If the risks are considered perfectly positively correlated, ie assumed to have a correlation equal to 1, the standard deviations can simply be added together. This gives the most conservative estimate of combined risk forcapital calculation purposes. In practice, this is the assumption used most often.

If risks are uncorrelated, ie correlation is assumed to be zero, variances can be added or the standard deviation is the root of the sum of the squares of the individual standard deviations. This obviously gives a number lower than that given when correlation is assumed to be +1.

Similarly, assumptions of negative correlation, or any correlation other than +1 will give a standard deviation number that is smaller and thereforeless conservative. Choice 'b' is the correct answer.

Governance structures specify the policies, principles and procedures for making decisions about corporate direction. They distribute rights and responsibiliies among stakeholders that typically include executive management, employees, the board etc. Statement I is therefore correct.

"Cybernetics is a transdisciplinary approach for exploring regulatory systems, their structures, constraints, and possibilities. In the 21st century, the term is often used in a rather loose way to imply "controlof any system using technology" (Wikipedia). Governance literature has been affected by cybernetics, which is not the same thing as information security or cyber security. Statement II is incorrect.

Corporate governance includes risk governance, and not the other way round. Therefore statement III is incorrect.

The Cadbury Report, titled Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, was a report issued in the UK in December 1992 by "The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance". The report is eponymous with the chair of the committee, and set out recommendations on the arrangement of company boards and accounting systems to mitigate corporate governance risks and failures. Statement IV is therefore correct.

Since the BHC always fails when the investment bank fails, the joint probability of default of the two is merely the probability of the investment bank failing, ie 0.05.

The probability of just the BHC failing, given that both the investment bank and the retail bank have survived will be equal to 0.11 - (0.05+0.05-0.05*0.05) = 0.0125. (The easiest way to understand this would be to consider a venn diagram, where the area under the largest circle is 0.11, and there are two intersecting circles inside this larger circle, each with an area of 0.05 and their intersection accounting for 0.05*0.05. We need to calculate the area outside of the two smaller circles, but within the larger circle representing the BHC).

Refer diagram below, please excuse the awful colors.

Hazard rate x Loss given default = CDS quote. In other words, Hazard rate x (1 - recovery rate) = CDS quote. We can therefore calculate the hazard rate for this problem as 200 bps/(1 - 40%) = 3.33%.

The ISDA MA provides a template that can be used by market participants to document derivativetransactions. It has a core section that applies always, and various schedules that can be agreed to by the parties. The ISDA MA considerably facilitates closing transactions once the ISDA MA has been has been negotiated, without requiring a renegotiationeach time.

A key feature of the ISDA MA is that it binds all transactions into a single net obligation. The ISDA Master 2002 states that "All transactions are entered into in reliance on the fact that this Master Agreement and all Confirmations form a single agreement between the parties ... and the parties would not otherwise enter into any Transactions." Therefore transactions under the ISDA MA are not considered separate obligations.

The ISDA MA does indeed define close out processes, default and termination events, and the CSA is one of the parts of the MA that describes the collateral related agreement.

We will need to calculate the joint probability distribution of the portfolio as follows.Probability of the joint default of both A and B =

The marginal probabilities (ie the standalone probabilities of default of the two bonds) are known, and if we can calculate the probability of joint defaults of the two bonds, we can calculate the rest of the entries. We thenmultiply the probabilities with the expected loss under each scenario and add them up to get the total expected loss.

The calculations are shown below. The expected loss is $5.5m, and therefore the correct answer is Choice 'd'.

Concentration risk in a credit portfolio arises due to a high degree of correlation betweenthe default probabilities of the issuers of securities in the portfolio. For example, the fortunes of the issuers in the same industry may be highly correlated, and an investor exposed to multiple such borrowers may face 'concentration risk'.

A low degreeof correlation, or independence of individual defaults in the portfolio actually reduces or even eliminates concentration risk.

The fact that issuers are from the same country may not necessarily give rise to concentration risk - for example, a bank withall US based borrowers in different industries or with different retail exposure types may not face practically any concentration risk. What really matters is the default correlations between the borrowers, for example a lender exposed to cement producersacross the globe may face a high degree of concentration risk.

Expected value = $90 ($100 - 10%)

Value at 99% confidence level = $65

Therefore economic capital required at this level of confidence = $90 - $65 = $25.

Choice 'a' is the correct answer, the other choices are not.

(We can also look at it this way as explained in section III.B.6.2.2 of the handbook: Economic capital is designed to absorb unexpected losses, which areequal to total losses at a given confidence level minus expected losses. (Expected losses are to be covered by credit reserves). Total losses are $100-$65=$35, and expected losses are 10%*$100=$10, therefore economic capital should be $35-$10=$25.)

Risks such as abrupt changes to a firm's businessmodel caused by legislation, or the introduction of capital controls in foreign countries where a firm in invested, geo-political risks etc are not modelable in the traditional sense. These risks cannot be modeled using VaR. Therefore statement I is correct.

VaR indeed does not consider liquidity risk, it is only concerned with the standard deviation of portfolio returns. Statement II is a valid criticism.

Statement III is not correct, as VaR can consider historical price movements.

Statement IV is correct,as VaR does not consider systemic risk or the risk of contagion.

The credit spread is equal to thedefault rate times the loss given default, or stated another way, default rate times (1 - recovery rate). It is not equal to the default rate times the recovery rate. Therefore statement I is not correct.

When ratings are upgraded by rating agencies, the spread contracts and not widen. Therefore statement II is not correct.

Both recovery rates and probabilities of default are related to the business cycle, and they move in opposite directions. Economic recessions witness an increase in the default rate anda decrease in the recovery rate, and economic expansions result in a decrease in the default rate and an increase in the recovery rates when default does happen. Therefore statement III is correct.

Bond spreads incorporate both the risk of default, but also considerations of liquidity in the case of corporate bonds. Hence statement IV is correct.