HP HPE7-A06 - HPE Campus Access Switching Expert Written Exam

Establish redundant links between the aggregation and core layers:When using Layer 3 routing between network layers (like Aggregation and Core),ECMP (Equal Cost Multi-Path)allows the routing protocol (e.g., OSPF, BGP) to utilize multiple links simultaneously if they have the same routing cost. This provides both redundancy (if one link fails, traffic uses the others) and load sharing across the links.

This question asks for the sequence of events when a user device connects to a network utilizing Dynamic Segmentation, which typically involves authentication via ClearPass and role-based policy assignment.

Authentication:When a device connects (wired or wireless), the first step in gaining secure access is authentication. The switch or AP (authenticator) facilitates this process, usually communicating via RADIUS with ClearPass Policy Manager (RADIUS server). The device provides credentials or uses certificates (e.g., 802.1X, MAC Auth).

Role Assignment:Upon successful authentication, ClearPass evaluates policies based on the device/user context (identity, posture, time of day, etc.) and sends back RADIUS attributes to the authenticator. A crucial attribute is the assigned User Role. This role encapsulates the access privileges and network configuration for the device.

Network Placement/Segmentation:The authenticator (switch/AP) uses the assigned role information received from ClearPass to place the device into the appropriate network segment. This might involve assigning a specific VLAN ID to the port/client or, in User-Based Tunneling (UBT) scenarios, establishing a tunnel to an Aruba Gateway associated with that role. The step "placed on a VLAN based on its role" describes one common method of segmentation based on the assigned role.

Access Granted:Once the device is authenticated, assigned a role, and placed in the correct network segment (VLAN or tunnel), access is granted according to the firewall rules, QoS settings, and other policies defined within that assigned role. Traffic can now flow subject to these enforced policies.

The question asks for the effects of adding the command neighbor 10.2.0.3 send-community both to the BGP configuration under the IPv4 address family context for neighbor R2 (10.2.0.3) on router R1.

send-community both:This command instructs R1 to send both standard (RFC 1997) and extended (RFC 4360) BGP community attributes to neighbor R2. By default, communities are not sent.

BGP Capability Negotiation:Adding or changing features like community advertisement modifies the BGP capabilities exchanged between neighbors during session establishment. Any change to these capabilities requires the BGP session to be reset (flap) so that the peers can renegotiate using the new capabilities.

Analysis of Options (Select Two):

A: Correct (partially). It enables R1 tosendstandard and extended communities. The ability toreceivedepends on the peer and local config. The capability isnegotiatedupon session reset.

B: Incorrect. Changing capabilities requires the session to flap; it's not without consequence.

C: Incorrect. It primarily enablesoutboundsending from R1. Inbound acceptance is implicit if the neighbor is activated.

D: Correct. Modifying BGP neighbor capabilities, such as enabling send-community, necessitates a BGP session reset (flap) for the change to take effect.

E: Incorrect terminology ("import/export", "type-1/type-2 communities").

Conclusion:The command enables R1 to send communities (A describes the purpose/capability), and adding this command to an existing session will cause the session to flap for renegotiation (D describes the immediate consequence).

The question asks how suspected rogue APs are classified using the default classification method for the “Suspected AP On-Prem” rule in HPE Aruba Networking Central.

Analysis of Options:

Option A:Correct. Suspected rogues are classified with a signal level of -65 dBm (indicating proximity) and WLAN classification of “On-Prem” (indicating they are on the premises).

Option B:Incorrect. A signal level of -55 dBm is too strong, and “Interfering” is not specific to on-premises rogues.

Option C:Incorrect. A signal level of -50 dBm is even stronger, and “Interfering” is incorrect.

Option D:Incorrect. “On Wire” classification applies to wired rogue detection, not wireless on-premises APs.

Why Option A is Correct:In HPE Aruba Networking Central, the “Suspected AP On-Prem” rule identifies rogue APs based on their signal strength and location. A signal level of -65 dBm indicates the AP is close enough to be on the premises, and the “On-Prem” classification confirms it’s detected within the managed network’s environment. This default rule helps identify potential security threats by flagging unauthorized APs with moderate to strong signals, distinguishing them from interfering or distant APs, as per Aruba’s wireless security framework.

Relevance to Certification Objectives:

WLAN (9%):Designing and troubleshooting RF attributes and wireless security functions.

Security (10%):Troubleshooting and identifying rogue APs in customer networks.

Troubleshooting (10%):Analyzing wireless issues using Aruba Central tools.

The correct order is:

identify

analyze

hypothesize

validate

implement

verify

This question requires arranging standard troubleshooting steps into a logical sequence. A systematic approach is crucial for effective network troubleshooting.

identify:The first step is always to clearly identify and define the problem. What are the symptoms? Who is affected? What is the scope? When did it start? Understanding the problem precisely is essential before proceeding.

analyze:Once the problem is identified, gather relevant data and analyze the situation. This involves checking logs, looking at configurations, examining network topology diagrams, checking status commands, and potentially capturing packets. This analysis helps build context around the identified issue.

hypothesize:Based on the identification and analysis, form a hypothesis (or multiple hypotheses) about the probable cause of the problem. This involves using technical knowledge and experience to theorize what might be wrong.

validate:Test the hypothesis to determine if it's correct. This step involves performing specific tests or checks designed to confirm or refute the theory. For example, if the hypothesis is a bad cable, test the cable. If it's a routing issue, check the routing table and perform trace routes. This step validates the cause before implementing a fix.

implement:Once the cause has been validated, implement the solution. This could involve replacing hardware, correcting configuration, clearing states, etc.

verify:After implementing the solution, verify that the original problem is resolved. It's also critical to check that the fix hasn't introduced any new issues. Monitor the system to ensure stability.

To enable DHCP Endpoint Profiling, the switch needs to forward relevant DHCP packets from the client to the ClearPass server. The most common method is configuring the switch to act as a DHCP relay agent for the ClearPass server IP address on the client VLAN's Switched Virtual Interface (SVI).

In scenarios where port access control (like 802.1X or MAC Auth) is enabled, clients might need to send DHCP requestsbeforethey are fully authenticated. To allow this while maintaining security, a pre-authentication role with limited access (specifically allowing DHCP) can be applied to the port initially.

The logical sequence based on the provided steps, assuming a pre-authentication workflow is intended, is:

Create the role:Define the pre-authentication role container and associate it with the appropriate initial VLAN if needed.

Permit DHCP in the role:Apply an Access Control List (ACL) or policy to this role that permits the necessary DHCP traffic (UDP ports 67 and 68). The step provided only mentions UDP 67, which allows the client's initial Discover/Request packets towards the server/relay. (A complete solution requires allowing return traffic on UDP 68 as well).

Apply the role:Configure the client-facing physical interface to use this pre-authentication role before the final role is assigned post-authentication.

Configure DHCP Relay:Configure the ip helper-address command on the client's VLAN SVI. This instructs the switch to forward the DHCP packets it receives from clients in that VLAN to the ClearPass server (in addition to forwarding them to the actual DHCP server). ClearPass receives these packets and extracts information for profiling.

This sequence ensures that even before full authentication, DHCP is permitted, and the necessary packets are relayed to ClearPass for profiling.

The user's device fails 802.1X EAP-TLS authentication, but the client-side certificate is known to be valid. We need two likely causes.

EAP-TLS Process:Involves mutual certificate validation and TLS handshake between client and RADIUS server (proxied by NAD).

Causes (Client Cert OK):

Server Certificate Issues: Client doesn't trust server cert (Untrusted CA, name mismatch, expired).

EAP Type Mismatch:Client supplicant configured for different EAP type than RADIUS server policy.

RADIUS Server Issues:Policy misconfiguration, user not found, internal errors.

NAD <-> RADIUS Communication Failure:Switch cannot reach RADIUS server (IP connectivity, firewall, routing), incorrect shared secret.

Client Supplicant Misconfiguration:Incorrect identity, settings other than the certificate itself.

Network packet loss.

Analysis of Options (Select Two):

A: Wrong gateway affects L3 post-authentication.

B: ACL blocking EAPoL/RADIUS is possible but less common than config errors.

C:EAP-type mismatch:A very common configuration error leading to failure.

D: Wrong MAC address is irrelevant for EAP-TLS failure itself.

E: NAD not able to communicate with DNS servers: DNS isn't directly involved in EAP-TLS. However, if interpreted more broadly asNAD not able to communicate with the RADIUS server(due to IP routing, firewall, or incorrect server address), this is a very common cause of failure.

Conclusion:An EAP-type mismatch (C) is a prime suspect when basic certificate validity is assumed. Failure of the Network Access Device (NAD - the switch) to communicate with the RADIUS server (E, interpreted broadly as RADIUS reachability) is another major category of failure causes.

The problem describes uplink congestion affecting VoIP traffic (marked with DSCP EF, value 46) on AGG-1's LAG1 uplink. The existing configuration classifies this traffic into voip_class and applies voip_policy inbound, setting local-priority 6. To improve reliable forwarding during congestion, VoIP traffic needs strict priority queuing on the egress interface (LAG1).  

Analysis of Options:

Option A applies a QoS schedule profile globally but doesn't modify the policy's local-priority or apply the schedule profile specifically to the congested LAG.  

Option B modifies voip_policy to set local-priority 7 (mapping DSCP 46 traffic to queue 7) and applies the 8qDwrStrict schedule profile to the egress interface lag 1. In the 8qDwrStrict profile, queue 7 is configured for strict priority, ensuring voice traffic gets precedence over lower-priority traffic during congestion. This aligns with best practices for QoS for VoIP.  

Option C also sets local-priority 7 and applies the schedule profile to lag 1, but the profile itself configures queue 7 with DWRR (Deficit Weighted Round Robin) instead of strict priority, which is less suitable for delay-sensitive voice traffic.  

Option D applies a schedule profile globally and uses DWRR for queue 7.  

Conclusion:Option B is the correct solution because it maps the DSCP EF traffic to the highest local priority (7) and applies a QoS schedule profile to the specific congested uplink (lag 1) that treats queue 7 with strict priority. This ensures voice traffic is prioritized reliably.

The goal is to add a static route on Router-1 to allow clients in VLAN 10 (subnet 10.2.10.0/24, presumably in VRF 'IoT-Medical' based on options) to reach services in the 10.1.100.0/24 subnet. The exhibit indicates interface 1/1/1 (IP 10.255.101.10/24) is in VRF 'service', and the likely next hop towards the destination is Core-1 at 10.255.101.11 (also implied to be reachable via VRF 'service'). This requires adding a route in the source VRF ('IoT-Medical') pointing towards the destination via the next hop in the 'service' VRF.

Static Route Syntax (with VRF):ip route [vrf ]

Analysis of Options:

A: Claims Core-1 isn't in VRF 'service', contradicting the likely setup.

B: Uses unusual interface:ip syntax (1/1/1:10.255.101.11). Defines the route in VRF 'IoT-Medical'.

C: Uses interface 1/1/1 as the next hop. This is less specific than using the IP address and relies on the interface being point-to-point or having proxy ARP enabled. Defines the route in VRF 'IoT-Medical'.

D: ip route 10.1.100.0/24 10.255.101.11 vrf IoT-Medical. This uses the standard syntax to define a static route for the destination 10.1.100.0/24 via the next-hop IP 10.255.101.11 within the context of the IoT-Medical VRF. The successful function of this route depends on inter-VRF routing (route leaking) being configured between 'IoT-Medical' and 'service' VRFs, but the command itself correctly defines the desired static route.

Conclusion:Option D provides the correct and standard command syntax to configure the required static route within the specified source VRF ('IoT-Medical').

ï‚· The router is able to process update messages. -->established

ï‚· The router is waiting for the neighbor's open message. -->open sent

ï‚· Routers have agreed on matching feature sets. -->open confirm

ï‚· The session establishment has timed out. -->idle

This question requires matching BGP connection states from the BGP Finite State Machine (FSM) to descriptions of conditions that occur within or lead to those states.

Idle:This is the initial state where BGP awaits a start event or retries after a failure. It's also the state entered upon error detection or session closure, including timeouts during connection attempts.

Matches:"The session establishment has timed out." - A timeout during the connection process forces the BGP process back to the Idle state to potentially retry later.

OpenSent:After a TCP connection is established, the local router sends a BGP OPEN message with its parameters (AS number, capabilities, etc.) and transitions to the OpenSent state while waiting to receive an OPEN message from its BGP neighbor.

Matches:"The router is waiting for the neighbor's open message."

OpenConfirm:Once the router receives an OPEN message from its neighbor and validates the parameters (e.g., matching AS, compatible capabilities), it sends a KEEPALIVE message and moves to the OpenConfirm state. It waits for a KEEPALIVE from the neighbor to confirm the session. Basic parameter checks and capability negotiations are successfully completed in this phase.

Matches:"Routers have agreed on matching feature sets." - This agreement happens upon successful validation of the OPEN messages exchanged.

Established:This is the final, stable state where BGP peering is successful. Both routers have accepted each other's parameters via the OPEN messages and confirmed the session with KEEPALIVEs. In this state, the routers can exchange UPDATE messages containing routing information.

Matches:"The router is able to process update messages."