Juniper JN0-636 - Security, Professional (JNCIP-SEC)

Your company wants to take your Juniper ATP Appliance into private mode. You must give them a list of impacted features for this request. The two features that are impacted in this scenario are:

A. False Positive Reporting. False Positive Reporting is a feature that allows you to report false positive detections to Juniper Networks for analysis and improvement. False Positive Reporting requires an Internet connection to send the reports to Juniper Networks. If you take your Juniper ATP Appliance into private mode, False Positive Reporting will be disabled and you will not be able to report false positives1.

C. GSS Telemetry. GSS Telemetry is a feature that allows you to send anonymized threat data to Juniper Networks for analysis and improvement. GSS Telemetry requires an Internet connection to send the data to Juniper Networks. If you take your Juniper ATP Appliance into private mode, GSS Telemetry will be disabled and you will not be able to contribute to the threat intelligence community2.

The other options are incorrect because:

B. Threat Progression Monitoring. Threat Progression Monitoring is a feature that allows you to monitor the threat activity and progression across your network. Threat Progression Monitoring does not require an Internet connection and can be performed locally by the Juniper ATP Appliance. If you take your Juniper ATP Appliance into private mode, Threat Progression Monitoring will not be impacted and you will still be able to monitor the threat activity and progression3.

D. Cyber Kill Chain mapping. Cyber Kill Chain mapping is a feature that allows you to map the threat activity and progression to the stages of the Cyber Kill Chain framework. Cyber Kill Chain mapping does not require an Internet connection and can be performed locally by the Juniper ATP Appliance. If you take your Juniper ATP Appliance into private mode, Cyber Kill Chain mapping will not be impacted and you will still be able to map the threat activity and progression4.

References:

False Positive Reporting

GSS Telemetry

Threat Progression Monitoring

Cyber Kill Chain Mapping

To solve the problem of the operator user being unable to save configuration files to a USB stick that is plugged into SRX, you need to add the system-control permission flag to the operations class. The other options are incorrect because:

A. Adding the floppy permission flag to the operations class is not sufficient or necessary to save configuration files to a USB stick. The floppy permission flag allows the user to access the floppy drive, but not the USB drive. The USB drive is accessed by the system permission flag, which is already included in the operations class1.

C. Adding the interface-control permission flag to the operations class is also not sufficient or necessary to save configuration files to a USB stick. The interface-control permission flag allows the user to configure and monitor interfaces, but not to save configuration files. The configuration permission flag, which is also already included in the operations class, allows the user to save configuration files1.

D. Adding the system permission flag to the operations class is redundant and ineffective to save configuration files to a USB stick. The system permission flag allows the user to access the system directory, which includes the USB drive. However, the operations class already has the system permission flag by default1. The problem is not the lack of system permission, but the lack of system-control permission.

Therefore, the correct answer is B. You need to add the system-control permission flag to the operations class to solve the problem. The system-control permission flag allows the user to perform system-level operations, such as rebooting, halting, or snapshotting the device1. These operations are required to mount, unmount, and copy files to and from the USB drive2. To add the system-control permission flag to the operations class, you need to perform the following steps:

Enter the configuration mode: user@host> configure

Navigate to the system login class hierarchy: user@host# edit system login class operations

Add the system-control permission flag: user@host# set permissions system-control

Commit the changes: user@host# commit

References:

login (System)

How to mount a USB drive on EX/SRX/MX/QFX Series platforms to import/export files

The purpose of the Switch Microservice of Policy Enforcer is to isolate infected hosts. The Switch Microservice is a component of Policy Enforcer that runs on EX Series and QFX Series switches. It communicates with Policy Enforcer and Juniper ATP Cloud to receive threat intelligence and quarantine commands. When an infected host is detected by Juniper ATP Cloud, Policy Enforcer sends a command to the Switch Microservice to isolate the host by applying an access control list (ACL) on the switch port where the host is connected. The ACL blocks all traffic from or to the host except for the traffic that is required for remediation. The Switch Microservice also tracks the MAC address of the infected host and updates Policy Enforcer if the host moves to a different switch port or a different switch. This way, the Switch Microservice ensures that the infected host is isolated until it is remediated and no longer poses a threat to the network. References: Juniper Security, Professional (JNCIP-SEC) Reference Materials source and documents: https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/security-policy-enforcer-switch-microservice-overview.html

The security feature that achieves the objective of identifying potential threats within SSL-encrypted sessions without requiring SSL proxy to decrypt the session contents is encrypted traffic insights. Encrypted traffic insights (ETI) is a feature of Juniper ATP Cloud that helps you to detect malicious threats that are hidden in encrypted traffic without intercepting and decrypting the traffic. ETI uses machine learning and behavioral analysis to identify anomalies and suspicious patterns in the encrypted traffic metadata, such as the SSL/TLS handshake, the certificate, the cipher suite, and the session duration. ETI can also leverage third-party feeds and threat intelligence from Juniper ATP Cloud to correlate the encrypted traffic with known indicators of compromise (IoCs). ETI can provide insights into the risk level, the threat category, the threat location, and the threat time of the encrypted traffic. ETI can also trigger mitigation actions, such as blocking, quarantining, or alerting, based on the threat severity and the policy configuration. ETI can help you to improve your security posture and visibility without compromising the privacy and performance of the encrypted traffic. References: Juniper Security, Professional (JNCIP-SEC) Reference Materials source and documents: https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/security-atp-cloud-encrypted-traffic-insights-overview.html

Juniper MX and SRX series devices support the integration of Seclntel feeds, which provide information about known command and control servers, for the purpose of blocking access to them. These devices can be configured to use the Seclntel feeds without the need for Security Director to manage the feeds.

EX series and QFX series devices are not capable of working in this situation, as they do not support the integration of Seclntel feeds.

According to the Juniper documentation, the two Juniper devices that work in this situation are MX Series devices and SRX Series devices. These devices can use the Juniper SecIntel feeds to block access to known command and control servers without using Security Director to manage the feeds. The Juniper SecIntel feeds are curated and verified threat intelligence data that are continuously collected from Juniper ATP Cloud, Juniper Threat Labs, and other sources. The SecIntel feeds include command and control IPs, URLs, certificate hashes, and domains that are used by attackers to control malware or maintain their connection to the network1.

The MX Series devices and the SRX Series devices can subscribe to the SecIntel feeds by using the following steps:

Configure the SecIntel service on the device by specifying the SecIntel URL, the SecIntel policy, and the SecIntel license2.

Configure the SecIntel policy on the device by specifying the SecIntel feeds, the SecIntel actions, and the SecIntel logging3.

Apply the SecIntel policy to the security zones or the firewall policies on the device by using the secintel-policy option4.

Once the SecIntel service is configured and applied, the MX Series devices and the SRX Series devices will receive the SecIntel feeds from Juniper ATP Cloud and use them to block the traffic from or to the command and control servers. The SecIntel service will also send the SecIntel logs to Juniper ATP Cloud or a third-party SIEM solution for further analysis and reporting.

The following devices are not suitable or incorrect for this situation:

EX Series devices: EX Series devices are Ethernet switches that can integrate with SecIntel to block infected hosts at the switch port. However, they cannot use the SecIntel feeds to block command and control servers, as they do not support the SecIntel service or policy.

QFX Series devices: QFX Series devices are Ethernet switches that can integrate with SecIntel to block infected hosts at the switch port. However, they cannot use the SecIntel feeds to block command and control servers, as they do not support the SecIntel service or policy.

References: 1: SecIntel Threat Intelligence 2: Configuring SecIntel Service 3: Configuring SecIntel Policy 4: Applying SecIntel Policy : [SecIntel Logging] : [SecIntel Integration with EX Series Switches] : [SecIntel Integration with QFX Series Switches]

According to the Juniper documentation, the steps to detect domain generation algorithms (DGA) on an SRX Series firewall are as follows:

Define a security-metadata-streaming policy under [edit services]. A security-metadata-streaming policy is a configuration that enables the SRX Series firewall to collect and stream security metadata, such as DNS queries and responses, to Juniper ATP Cloud for analysis. Juniper ATP Cloud uses machine learning models and known pre-computed DGA domain names to provide domain verdicts, which helps in-line blocking and sinkholing of DNS queries on SRX Series firewalls1. You can define a security-metadata-streaming policy by using the following command:

set services security-metadata-streaming policy

Attach the security-metadata-streaming policy to a security zone. A security zone is a logical grouping of interfaces that have similar security requirements. You can attach the security-metadata-streaming policy to a security zone by using the following command:

set security zones security-zone services security-metadata-streaming policy

The following steps are not required or incorrect:

Define an advanced-anti-malware policy under [edit services]. An advanced-anti-malware policy is a configuration that enables the SRX Series firewall to scan files for malware using Juniper ATP Cloud. It is not related to DGA detection2.

Attach the advanced-anti-malware policy to a security policy. A security policy is a configuration that defines the rules for permitting or denying traffic between security zones. It is not related to DGA detection3.

References: 1: Configuring Security Metadata Streaming 2: Configuring Advanced Anti-Malware Policies 3: Configuring Security Policies

https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/release-independent/jatp/topics/task/configuration/jatp-traffic-collectorsetting-ssh-honeypot-detection.html

According to the Juniper documentation, reflexive NAT is a type of source NAT that allows an internal host to communicate with an external host using a single public IP address and port. The reflexive NAT session is created when the internal host initiates the traffic to the external host, and the session is deleted when the traffic stops. The reflexive NAT session is bidirectional, meaning that the external host can send traffic back to the internal host using the same public IP address and port that the internal host used to reach the external host. However, the external host cannot initiate a new session to the internal host using the same public IP address and port, unless the internal host has already established a session with the external host. Therefore, only the Internet host that the internal host originally communicated with can initiate traffic to reach the internal host using the 203.0.113.1 address, a random source port, and destination port 54311. References: [Configuring Reflexive NAT]

The exhibit shows the configuration of filter-based forwarding on an SRX Series device. Filter-based forwarding is a feature that allows the device to use firewall filters to direct traffic to different routing instances based on the match criteria. In this scenario, the device has two routing instances - ISP-1 and ISP-2 - and two firewall filters - FBF and FBF-ISP-1. The FBF filter is applied to the ge-0/0/1 interface as an input filter. The FBF filter has one term that matches the traffic from the 172.25.0.0/24 network and directs it to the ISP-1 routing instance. The ISP-1 routing instance has a static route to the next hop 172.20.0.2. The FBF-ISP-1 filter is applied to the ge-0/0/0 interface as an output filter. The FBF-ISP-1 filter has one term that matches the traffic to the 172.20.0.2 next hop and sets the forwarding class to expedited-forwarding.

The problem in this scenario is that the traffic from the other network (172.25.1.0/24) is not being forwarded to the upstream 172.21.0.2 neighbor. This is because the FBF filter does not have a term that accepts the traffic from the 172.25.1.0/24 network. The FBF filter only has one term that matches the traffic from the 172.25.0.0/24 network and directs it to the ISP-1 routing instance. The traffic from the 172.25.1.0/24 network does not match this term and is therefore discarded by the implicit deny action at the end of the filter. The traffic from the 172.25.1.0/24 network should be forwarded to the ISP-2 routing instance, which has a static default route to the next hop 172.21.0.2.

To solve this problem, you must add another term to the FBF filter to accept the traffic from the 172.25.1.0/24 network. This term should have the action accept, which means that the traffic will be forwarded according to the routing table of the master routing instance. The master routing instance has a static default route to the ISP-2 routing instance, which in turn has a static default route to the next hop 172.21.0.2. By adding this term, the traffic from the 172.25.1.0/24 network will be forwarded to the upstream 172.21.0.2 neighbor as expected.

The configuration of the new term in the FBF filter could look something like this:

[edit firewall family inet filter FBF] term 2 { from { source-address { 172.25.1.0/24; } } then { accept; } }

References: Juniper Security, Professional (JNCIP-SEC) Reference Materials source and documents: https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/firewall-filter-option-filter-based-forwarding-overview.html https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/example/filter-based-forwarding-example.html